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I. INTRODUCTION
During the first week of the current Term, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in a case testing the validity and limits of the "misappropriation theory"
of liability for insider trading. The petitioners in Carpenter v. United States--R.
Foster Winans, a former Wall Street Journal reporter, and his two codefendants,
Kenneth P. Felis and David Carpenter-were challenging their convictions of
securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. 2 Winans, Felis, Carpenter, and others
had participated in a scheme of buying and selling stocks on the basis of advance
information, supplied by Winans, concerning what had been written about those
stocks in articles that were to be published in the Journal's "Heard on the Street"
column.3 In affirming the defendants' convictions under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19344 and rule 1Ob-5,5 a divided panel of the Second
* Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor, The University of Texas School of Law. B.S. 1960, Stanford
University; J.D. 1966, University of California, Berkeley.
1. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
2. Petitioners Winans and Fells had been convicted of violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1987); the federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982); and the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Petitioner Carpenter had
been convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. United States v.
Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
3. Winans was one of the two authors of the "Heard on the Street" column, which discussed selected stocks or
groups of stocks and expressed "a point of view with respect to investment in the stocks ...- United States v. Winans,
612 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Although the column did not disclose any inside information about the
corporations or stocks that it discussed, it did affect stock prices. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1987).
The Journal had an official policy declaring that the contents of the "Heard" column, prior to publication, were
confidential information belonging to the Journal. Nevertheless, Winans entered into a trading scheme with two securities
brokers, Peter Brant and petitioner Fells, to whom he gave advance information concerning the contents of articles that
were to be published in the column. Brant, Fells, and one of Brant's clients thereafter bought and sold stocks in
anticipation of the column's probable impact on the market. Id. at 319. Carpenter served primarily as a messenger for the
conspirators. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
Over a four-month period, the brokers made almost $690,000 of trading profits on the basis of the information
provided by Winans. After the SEC commenced an investigation, Winans and Carpenter revealed the entire scheme. The
trial of Winans, Felis, and Carpenter followed. Brant entered into a plea bargain and served as a witness for the
prosecution. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1987).
4. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
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Circuit had relied on the misappropriation theory 6-the theory that a person violates
rule lOb-5 when he buys or sells securities on the basis of material nonpublic
information that he misappropriated from another person. 7 According to the Second
Circuit, Winans had committed a "fraud" on the Journal by misappropriating its
"confidential schedule of forthcoming publications,"-8 and the defendants had
violated rule lOb-5 by using the misappropriated information "in connection with"
their purchases and sales of securities. 9
Less than six weeks after the oral argument in Carpenter, the Supreme Court
announced its decision.1" Those who had expected the Court to settle the fate of the
misappropriation theory, once and for all, were disappointed. Most of the Court's
brief opinion was devoted to a discussion of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes,
which all eight Justices agreed the defendants had violated." One cryptic sentence
disposed of the issues under rule lOb-5: "The Court is evenly divided with respect to
the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment
below on those counts."' 2
Different legal experts reacted quite differently to the Court's four-to-four
deadlock on the question of whether the Carpenter defendants had committed
securities fraud. A member of the Securities and Exchange Commission insisted that
the Justices had left the misappropriation theory "alive and well."'' 3 A prominent law
professor, on the other hand, thought that the decision indicated "pretty strongly"
that the theory was "a fairly dubious proposition."' 4 Perhaps the least controversial
appraisal was offered by a former SEC official: "The fact that it's four to four shows
there is a split in the Court." 15
This Article will explore the possible explanations for the division of the Court
in Carpenter and argue that all of the Justices should have endorsed the misappro-
priation theory. In addition, it will examine the impact of the Carpenter decision on
civil and criminal proceedings against defendants who have traded on misappropri-
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6. Judge Pierce, writing for himself and Judge Mansfield, had stated the panel's holding in these words:
[S]ection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 proscribe an employee's unlawful
misappropriation from his employer, a financial newspaper, of material nonpublic information in the form of
the newspaper's forthcoming publication schedule, in connection with a scheme to purchase and sell securities
to be analyzed or otherwise discussed in future columns in that newspaper...
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986).
7. See Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HoFmsRA L. Rav. 101, 114 (1984).
8. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986).
9. Id. at 1032.
10. United States v. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316, argued Oct. 7, 1987, decided Nov. 16, 1987.
11. See id. at 320-22.
12. Id. at 320.
13. Sontag, Misappropriation Theory in Limbo: An SEC Victory-or Not?, The Nat'l L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 10,
col. 2 (quoting SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest).
14. Donovan, Supreme Court Upholds Conviction of Former Business Writer Winans, Investor's Daily, Nov. 17,
1987, at 1, col. 4 (quoting Alan Bromberg, professor of securities law at Southern Methodist University).
15. Id. at 34, col. 1 (quoting Ira Lee Sorkin, a New York lawyer and the former top official of the SEC in New
York).
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ated information. Finally, it will evaluate a pending proposal for a new, comprehen-
sive federal statute directed against insider trading.
II. THE DEADLOCK IN CARPENTER
A. The Probable Sticking Point
It is hardly surprising that experts in securities law have disagreed about the
viability of the misappropriation theory after the Carpenter decision. Because the
four members of the Supreme Court who voted to reverse the defendants' convictions
for securities fraud neither identified themselves nor explained their positions, one
can only speculate whether they disapproved of the misappropriation theory in
general or simply of its application to the facts before them.
Carpenter was, by any reckoning, an unusual case. Despite the Second Circuit's
firm commitment to the misappropriation theory, Judge Miner dissented from the
panel decision in Carpenter on the ground that the defendants had not abused any
position of trust to obtain the "non-public, confidential, securities-related
information."'16 In his view, basing the defendants' convictions on Winans' misap-
propriation of the Journal's publication schedule "extend[ed] the sweep of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 beyond all reasonable bounds." 17
As Judge Miner emphasized, Carpenter can easily be distinguished from the two
earlier cases in which the Second Circuit had endorsed and applied the misappropri-
ation theory. In those cases, United States v. Newman18 and SEC v. Materia,19
employees had misappropriated confidential information that had been entrusted to
their employers by clients preparing to engage in corporate acquisitions. In Newman,
the Second Circuit expressly held that the defendant employees had both
"defrauded" their employers and "wronged" their employers' clients, the acquiring
companies. 20 In Carpenter, however, Winans had misappropriated information-
"information regarding the timing and content of certain Journal columns" 21-that
belonged to the Wall Street Journal itself. Under the Second Circuit's reasoning,
Winans had committed a fraud on the Journal,22 but not on any "market
participant. "23 Unlike the acquiring companies that owned the information purloined
by the defendants in Newman and Materia, the Journal did not engage in, and did not
plan to engage in, any transaction in securities.
16. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986) (Miner, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original).
17. Id. at 1037.
18. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
19. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
20. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
21. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 1032.
23. The Supreme Court noted in Carpenter that the Journal "was not a buyer or seller of the stocks traded in or
otherwise a market participant." Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1987).
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According to the petitioners' brief in Carpenter, the Second Circuit's decision
illegitimately "transformed Rule lOb-5 into a law governing relationships outside the
securities markets. "24 An examination of the Supreme Court's opinion in Carpenter
indicates that some members of the Court may have agreed with the petitioners that
the Second Circuit erred in construing rule lOb-5 to protect persons other than buyers
and sellers of securities. Even if they accepted the results in Newman and Materia,
some Justices may have balked at interpreting the misappropriation theory to
encompass the misuse of information belonging to a "market observer'"'2 rather than
to a "market participant. "26
The Supreme Court's opinion in Carpenter begins with a statement of the facts
of the case and continues with the following paragraph:
The District Court found, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Winans had knowingly
breached a duty of confidentiality by misappropriating prepublication information regarding
the timing and contents of the "Heard" columns, information that had been gained in the
course of his employment under the understanding that it would not be revealed in advance
of publication and that if it were, he would report it to his employer. It was this appropriation
of confidential information that underlay both the securities laws and mail and wire fraud
counts. With respect to the § 10(b) charges, the courts below held that the deliberate breach
of Winans' duty of confidentiality and concealment of the scheme was a fraud and deceit on
the Journal. Although the victim of the fraud, the Journal, was not a buyer or seller of the
stocks traded in or otherwise a market participant, the fraud was nevertheless considered to
be "in connection with" a purchase or sale of securities within the meaning of the statute
and the rule. The courts reasoned that the scheme's sole purpose was to buy and sell
securities at a profit based on advance information of the column's contents. The courts
below rejected petitioners' submission, which is one of the two questions presented here,
that criminal liability could not be imposed on petitioners under Rule lOb-5 because "the
newspaper is the only alleged victim of fraud and has no interest in the securities traded." 27
The above-quoted paragraph contains the Court's entire discussion prefatory to
its announcement that is was "evenly divided with respect to the convictions under
the securities laws." 28 In this paragraph the Court adverted to two critical conclusions
of the lower courts: (1) that "the deliberate breach of Winans' duty of confidentiality
and concealment of the scheme was a fraud and deceit on the Journal," and (2) that
the fraud occurred "'in connection with' a purchase or sale of securities within the
meaning of [section 10(b) and rule lOb-5]" even though "the victim of the fraud, the
Journal, was not a buyer or seller of the stocks traded in or otherwise a market
participant. "29 By indicating that these two conclusions accounted for the defen-
dants' convictions under rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court invited the inference that the
24. Brief for Petitioners at 21, Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (No. 86-422).
25. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government characterized the Wall Street Journal as a "market
observer." Brief for the United States at 45, Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (No. 86-422) (emphasis
in original).
26. The petitioners in Carpenter conceded that "[fn the 'insider trading' context, a 'misappropriation theory'
might arguably be applied without doing violence to the historic meaning of fraud or to the intent of the federal securities
laws where 'misappropriated information' belongs to a market participant." Brief for Petitioners at 19, Carpenter v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (No. 86-422) (footnotes omitted).
27. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319-20 (1987).
28. Id. at 320.
29. See id. at 319.
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four Justices who voted to reverse the convictions did so because they disagreed with
one or both of the conclusions.
Before the Court decided Carpenter, a number of commentators had expressed
doubt that an employee who breaches a fiduciary duty to his employer by
misappropriating the employer's confidential information is guilty of "deception" or
"fraud." ' 30 It seems unlikely, however, that any member of the Supreme Court
rejected the lower courts' conclusion in Carpenter that Winans' "deliberate breach of
[his] duty of confidentiality and concealment of the scheme was a fraud and deceit"
on the Wall Street Journal.3' After all, the Justices unanimously agreed that the
defendants' activities constituted a "scheme to defraud" the Journal within the
meaning of the mail and wire fraud statutes. 32 Winans, the Court observed, had
misappropriated his employer's confidential business information, "all the while
pretending to perform his duty of safeguarding it. '33 He had engaged in deceit "as
he played the role of a loyal employee." 34 That deceit was enough to support a
finding that he had committed "fraud" under the mail and wire fraud statutes and,
presumably, was enough to support a finding that he had committed "fraud" under
rule lOb-5 as well. 35
The most plausible explanation for the division of the Court in Carpenter is that
four Justices rejected the proposition that "[a]lthough the victim of the fraud, the
Journal, was not a buyer or seller," Winans' fraud nevertheless had occurred "'in
connection with' a purchase or sale of securities."36 The petitioners' brief hammered
away at the point that "[t]he only victim of fraud alleged by the government ... was
the Journal, a financial newspaper which had absolutely no interest in the purchase,
sale or value of any of the securities traded by petitioners.' '37 Even before the
Carpenter case arose, some commentators had questioned whether any fraud
perpetrated on a non-trading party could be said to have occurred "in connection
with" a securities transaction. 38
In a purely logical sense, it is obvious that there was a "connection" between
Winans' misappropriation of the Journal's information and the defendants' purchases
and sales of securities. Indeed, the purchase and sale of securities was the "'sole
30. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider
Trading-Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, reprinted in 41 Bus.
LAw. 223, 237 (1985); Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Needfor Legislative Repair, 13 HoFSTrA L. REv.
65, 91 (1984); Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,
1985 DuKE L.J. 960, 983; Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1272 (1981). But see Aldave, supra
note 7, at 118-21.
31. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1987).
32. Id. at 320.
33. Id. at 322.
34. Id.
35. "The concept of 'fraud' includes the act of embezzlement, which is "'the fraudulent appropriation to one's
own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by another."'" Id. at 321 (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181,
189 (1902)).
36. Id. at 319.
37. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (No. 86-422).
38. See, e.g., Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF.
L. R v. 1, 47 (1982); Wang, Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market Inside Trading, 6 Cot'.
L. REv. 291, 302 (1983).
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purpose'" of the defendants' scheme.3 9 The Supreme Court, however, described the
issue as whether a fraud had been committed" 'in connection with' a purchase or sale
of securities within the meaning of the statute and the rule.'"'4 As the Court
apparently saw it, the question was not whether there was a logical nexus between
Winans' misappropriation of information from the Journal and the defendants'
subsequent trading. Rather, the question was whether section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
should be interpreted, as a matter of policy, to protect the interests of a party which
"was not a buyer or seller of the stocks traded in or otherwise a market
participant. "41
If one formulates the issue in Carpenter as stated in the preceding sentence, one
can easily understand why four members of the Supreme Court voted to reverse the
defendants' convictions under rule lOb-5. The purpose of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws is to protect the interests of investors, not the property
rights of employers or the reputations of newspapers. 42 If, in fact, the defendants
injured no one but the Journal, they should not have been convicted of violating rule
lOb-5. The members of the Court were in error, however, if they believed that the
Journal was the only victim, or even the principal victim, of the defendants' fraud.
B. A Suggested Analysis
Because a fraud is not complete until someone is injured, 43 the fraud committed
by the Carpenter defendants did not consist solely of the misappropriation of
confidential information from the Journal. Neither the Journal nor any other person
would have been harmed if Winans had simply taken a copy of the Journal's
publication schedule home with him and locked it in a strong box. Nor did the fraud
consist of the misappropriation of the Journal's information and the defendants'
failure to disclose that information to particular securities traders or to the public.
Obviously, Winans and his codefendants had no duty, and no right, to disseminate
advance information to anyone about what would appear in the Journal on a given
date. 44 Rather, the fraud consisted of Winans' misappropriation of the Journal's
confidential information and the defendants' subsequent trading on that information.
Both the misappropriation and the trading were essential elements of the defendants'
fraudulent scheme.
39. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983)).
40. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1987) (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30, at 91; Silver, supra note 30, at 983.
43. Damage is an element of common-law fraud or deceit. See 2 F. HaREr, F. JA s, JR., & 0. GRAY, TrE LAw
OF ToRTs § 7.1, at 381 (2d ed. 1986); L. Loss, FtmDAmENrms OF Sacuosas REGULATION 712 (2d ed. 1988). Professor
Loss asserts, however, that "the establishment of a 'scheme ... to defraud' under [Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act
of 1933] is not dependent on proof that any victim suffered actual loss." Id. at 723. Presumably, the establishment of a
"scheme... to defraud" under rule lOb-5(a) does not require proof of actual loss either.
44. "Disclosure by the employee [of confidential information that he misappropriated from his employer] would
aggravate the breach of duty to the employer, not cure it." Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30, at 91.
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Only after one has acknowledged that the defendants' entire scheme constituted
a "fraud" can one accurately identify all the parties or classes of parties who were
victims of that fraud. The victim of Winans' misappropriation was the Wall Street
Journal, which was deprived of an intangible property right.45 The victims of the
defendants' trading, however, were investors. The defendants inflicted concrete
economic injuries on those anonymous investors who were induced by the defen-
dants' trading to buy or sell securities on unfavorable terms, or were preempted by
the defendants' trading from buying or selling securities on favorable terms. 46 The
defendants' fraud caused innocent members of the investing public to suffer net losses
in the amount of the defendants' illicit gains. 47
In a case like Carpenter, in which the defendants have misappropriated
confidential information from a non-trading party and used that information in buying
and selling securities on a stock exchange, the federal securities laws may not provide
a remedy to any of the persons injured by the defendants' fraud. The non-trading
victim of the defendants' misappropriation will not have standing to sue for damages
under rule lOb-5. 48 The members of the investing public who were injured by the
defendants' trading ordinarily will be unaware, and unable to prove, that they were
harmed. 49 That there may be no private plaintiffs who can sue the wrongdoers under
the securities laws should not, however, obscure the fact that the defendants
committed a fraud, and that its victims included investors.
45. In affirming the mail and wire fraud convictions of the Carpenter defendants, the Supreme Court reasoned that
they had deprived the Journal of its "right to exclusive use" of its confidential business information. Carpenter v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987).
46. As Professor Wang has demonstrated, every "inside trade"--i.e., trade made on the basis of material
nonpublic information-injures "induced traders," "preempted traders," or both:
The inside trade could induce opposite trade transactions that otherwise would not have occurred, or preempt
trades of the same type that otherwise would have occurred. Thus, there are at least two categories of people
harmed by an inside trade: those who would not have made bad purchases or sales but for the inside trade; and
those who would have made good purchases or sales but for the inside trade.
Wang, supra note 30, at 1235 (footnote omitted).
The inside trade may also injure some investors who trade on the same side of the market as the "inside trader":
If a substantial purchase or sale based on nonpublic information causes the specialist or market-maker to
change his price quotations, those engaging in the same type of transaction at approximately the same time as
the inside trade (the "same type" class) will either pay more or receive less than they otherwise would....
Although the members of the same type class are unquestionably worse off, those with whom they transact
(the "opposite type" class) are better off. Members of the same type class, however, are unsympathetic figures.
Along with the inside trader, they are either buying into a windfall gain or selling into a windfall avoidance of
loss.
Id. at 1239-40 (footnote omitted).
In short, "any particular inside trade clearly harms other investors." Id. at 1321.
47. "When someone trades on nonpublic information, the group of all other investors suffers a net loss. (Some
members of this group gain, others lose; but the losses will exceed gains.)... The group's net loss is equivalent to the
inside trader's gain." Id. at 1235.
48. Only a person who has purchased or sold securities can sue for damages under the rle. See Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drg Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735-36 (1975).
49. Although those who trade on nonpublic information injure specific investors, the injured investors generally
cannot be identified. "In practice, it is impossible to recreate the hypothetical universe that would have existed" in the
absence of the unlawful trading. The trading "directly or indirectly changes the inventory of a specialist or market-maker.
There is no way of knowing how this change alters the intermediary's price quotations, and how these quotations affect
the behavior of public investors." Wang, supra note 30, at 1312.
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In its brief in the Carpenter case, the government argued that trading on
misappropriated information damages the integrity of the securities markets and
undermines public confidence in the honesty of those markets, to the detriment of all
investors.50 While the government's position has considerable merit, one need not
posit an indirect injury to the amorphous class of all investors in order to justify
bringing the wrongdoing of the Carpenter defendants within the coverage of the
federal securities laws. In fact, the defendants had committed a fraud in connection
with the purchase and sale of securities, and that fraud had damaged investors-
specific if unidentifiable investors. The Supreme Court should have held, unani-
mously, that the defendants had violated rule lOb-5.
II. THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF CARPENTER
A. The Future of the Misappropriation Theory
If the four members of the Supreme Court who voted to reverse the securities
fraud convictions of the Carpenter defendants did so because they entirely disap-
proved of the misappropriation theory, and if Justice Kennedy51 should also prove
hostile to that theory, the Court might repudiate it in some future case. Without the
aid of the misappropriation theory, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 would lose much of
their efficacy as weapons against trading on nonpublic information, since they would
no longer extend to trading by "outsiders.' '52 As explained above, 53 however, at least
some of the four members of the Court who voted to reverse the securities fraud
convictions in Carpenter probably did so only because they were unconvinced that
the defendants' fraud had injured any market participant. These Justices might well
vote differently in a more typical misappropriation case, 54 or one in which the
50. Brief for the United States at 42-45, Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (No. 86-422). The
government also cited the Second Circuit's argument that the defendants had used the information they misappropriated
from the Journal "for [their own] financial benefit... and to the financial detriment of those investors with whom [they]
traded." Id. at 44 (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986)).
51. On November 11, 1987, President Reagan nominated Judge Anthony M. Kennedy of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to fill the Supreme Court vacancy that had been created by the resignation of Associate Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., at the end of the Court's 1986 Term. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 6 (late city final ed.). The
United States Senate confirmed Judge Kennedy's appointment on February 3, 1988. Id., Feb. 4, 1988, at A18, col. 1 (late
city final ed.). He was sworn in as Justice Kennedy on February 18, 1988. Id., Feb. 19, 1988, at A10, col. I (late city
final ed.).
52. Under the mode of anlysis approved by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980),
and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983),
a person violates Rule lOb-5 by buying or selling securities on the basis of material nonpublic information if (1)
he owes a fiduciary or similar duty to the other party to the transaction; (2) he is an insider of the corporation
in whose shares he trades, and thus owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders; or (3) he is a tippee
who received his information from an insider of the corporation and knows, or should know, that the insider
breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing the information to him.
Aldave, supra note 7, at 101-02.
The reasoning of Chiarella and Dirks does not bar trading on material nonpublic information by an "outsider"----a
person who is not an insider of the issuer and has not improperly received information from an insider." Id. at 112. The
misappropriation theory, on the other hand, bars any person, insider or outsider, from trading on the basis of material
nonpublic information that he misappropriated from another person. See id. at 121.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
54. For examples of more typical cases, see SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); and SEC v.
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government successfully demonstrated that those who profit by trading on misap-
propriated nonpublic information always cause damage to other investors. In any
event, the evenly divided vote in Carpenter leaves the misappropriation theory intact
for the present, most notably in the Second Circuit, where insider-trading litigation
is concentrated. 55
B. The "Criminalization" of Insider-Trading Law
Even if the Supreme Court were to repudiate the misappropriation theory at
some time in the future, the Carpenter decision ensures that the Department of Justice
could continue to prosecute persons who had traded on the basis of misappropriated
nonpublic information. In the second part of its opinion in Carpenter, the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the defendants' convictions under the mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes56 on the far-reaching theory that Winans' misappropriation of the
Journal's publication schedule had deprived the Journal of a "property right '"57 -
the right to "exclusive use" of its "confidential business information. "58 Hereafter,
anyone who misappropriates confidential business information for the purpose of
trading on it will, as long as she uses the mails or wires to further her scheme, be
subject to criminal prosecution under the federal mail or wire fraud statutes. 59 It may
make little difference, as a practical matter, whether she can be prosecuted for
violating rule lOb-5 as well.6
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (mem.). In these cases employees had misappropriated information that had
been entrusted to their employers by market participants-companies preparing to purchase securities.
55. Most insider-trading cases have a strong nexus to New York, the site of the major stock exchanges.
56. The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered
by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the
person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
57. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
58. Id. at 321.
59. The Court's affirmance of the Carpenter defendants' convictions of mail and wire fraud eased the concerns of
prosecutors about the breadth of the ruling in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). In McNally, the Court
had held that the mail fraud statute does not outlaw "schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and
impartial government," id. at 2879, but is "limited in scope to the protection of property rights." Id. at 2881. In
Carpenter, however, the Court made it clear that "McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished
from intangible property rights." Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987). "Confidential business
information has long been recognized as property," said the Court, and "its intangible nature" does not remove it from
the protection of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Id.
60. Under the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, see 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (1987), multiple counts
of conviction for offenses that involve "substantially the same harm" are grouped together for the purpose of determining
the defendant's sentence. Id. § 3D1.2 at 18,089. If a defendant is convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud, the "base
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The Court's expansive reading of the mail and wire fraud statutes, in conjunction
with its failure to endorse the misappropriation theory, could accelerate the
"criminalization" of insider-trading law. 61 Because the Securities and Exchange
Commission cannot be certain that the Supreme Court will sustain any judgment
dependent on the misappropriation theory, it may hesitate to bring civil actions in
some cases in which it must rely on that theory. The Department of Justice, on the
other hand, does not need to invoke the misappropriation theory, or to depend solely
on that theory, to support criminal charges against defendants who have used the
wires or mails in furtherance of an insider-trading scheme. A possible result is that
proportionally more persons accused of insider trading will be pursued by a U.S.
Attorney, and proportionally fewer by the SEC.
C. Implications for Private Actions
Carpenter may also prove to be a boon to private plaintiffs who seek damages
from defendants who traded on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic information.
Although the Second Circuit has decided three cases endorsing the government's use
of the misappropriation theory, 62 it has held that the theory does not support a private
remedy for plaintiffs who traded on the opposite side of the market from defendants
who traded on the basis of misappropriated information. 63 Thus, the investors who
sold the stocks that the Carpenter defendants purchased, or purchased the stocks that
the Carpenter defendants sold, could not have stated a cause of action against the
defendants under rule lOb-5. The Carpenter decision, however, increases the
possibility that private plaintiffs may be able to recover damages from insider-trading
defendants under RICO. 64
offense level" of her misconduct will be "6."Id. § 2FI.1 at 18,069. If she also is convicted of insider trading in violation
of rule lOb-5, the "base offense level" of her misconduct will be "8." Id. § 2FI.2 at 18,070. The two-point difference
may be relatively minor in comparison to other factors considered in calculating the defendant's "total offense level" (on
a scale of "1" to "43," see id. at 18,095-96), and determining an appropriate sentence.
61. See Peloso, Securities, Commodities Litigation: The Criminalization of Securities Laws, N.Y.L.J., May 28,
1987, at 1, col. I (arguing that the SEC is abdicating part of its enforcement function by allowing the U.S. Attorney to
decide for himself which defendants to prosecute, and for what offenses).
62. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
63. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
The plaintiff in Moss sold shares of a target company prior to the public announcement of a tender offer for the
company's stock. On the day of the plaintiff's sale, the defendants purchased shares of the target company on the basis
of information that one of them had misappropriated from his employer, the investment banker for the tender offeror.
When the tender offer was announced a week later, the defendants tendered their shares and made a substantial profit. The
Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action under rule l0b-5, because the defendants did not
owe a duty of disclosure to the shareholders of the target company, id. at 13, or to the entire marketplace, id. at 16.
64. Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), in 1970 in an effort to halt the infiltration of organized crime into American businesses. See
Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NonTa DAmE L. Ray. 237, 249-53
(1982).
The statute contains four prohibitions. Frst, RICO declares it unlawful for any person who has received any income
from a pattern of racketeering activity to use or invest that income in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). Second, RICO declares it unlawful for any person to acquire or maintain any interest in any such enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. § 1962(b). Third, RICO makes it unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any such enterprise to conduct or participate in the conduct of its affairs through a pattern of racketeering
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Both mail fraud and wire fraud are acts of "racketeering activity" as defined in
RICO, and a "pattern of racketeering activity" requires the commission of at least
two such acts within a ten-year period. 65 A person who has been "injured in his
business or property" by a defendant's conduct of the affairs of an "enterprise"
through a pattern of racketeering activity can recover treble damages, plus attorney's
fees, from the defendant. 66 Although some of the ground rules for establishing a
private cause of action under RICO are still unclear, 67 the Carpenter decision is likely
to encourage the filing of civil RICO actions by plaintiffs who may be unable to state
a claim under rule 1Ob-5, but who can allege the elements of mail fraud or wire fraud.
IV. THE SEC's LEGIstATwE PROPOSAL
A. An Overview of the Proposal
At one time the SEC opposed the enactment of a statutory definition of illegal
insider trading. 63 Arguing that existing law was "sufficiently clear to provide
guidance as to prohibited transactions, ' 69 the Commission wished to retain the
flexibility of a case-by-case approach, 70 and worried that a statutory definition
"would create new uncertainties and spawn future litigation." '7' After the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Carpenter,72 however, the Commission announced that it
"could support a definition that preserved its authority and flexibility."7 3 In August
activity. Id. § 1962(c). And, fourth, RICO makes it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the foregoing
provisions. Id. § 1962(d).
RICO defines "racketeering activity" to mean any of a number of state and federal offenses, including indictable
mail fraud or wire fraud, or "any offense involving, fraud in the sale of securities... punishable under any law of
the United States." Id. § 1961(1). A "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
... the last of which occurred within ten years... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id. §
1961(5).
The government can seek criminal penalties or civil remedies for violations of RICO. Id. §§ 1963, 1964(a)-(b), (d).
The statute also creates a private cause of action. "Any person injured in his business or property" by a RICO violation
may sue to "recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Id. § 1964(c).
65. See supra note 64.
66. See id.
67. For an excellent discussion of the major precedents and unresolved issues under RICO, particularly in relation
to securities litigation, see R. JeNonsns & H. MAsH, SEcUarrMs RE uLAIION: CASES AN MATrEIUA.s 1493-1508 (6th ed.
1987).
Perhaps the most important current issue is what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity." See Black,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)---Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime after
Sedima: What is a "Pattern of Racketeering Activity"?, 6 PACE L. REv. 365 (1986).
68. When Congress was considering the bill which became the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, the SEC
opposed the addition to it of a definition of insider trading. See Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement
Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 92, 98 (1983) (letter of John S. R. Shad, Chairman, SEC, to Subcomm. Chairman Timothy E.
Wirth).
69. Id. at 92.
70. See id. at 99.
71. Id. at 92.
72. The petition for a writ of certiorari was granted on December 15, 1986. Carpenter v. United States, 107 S. Ct.
666 (1986).
73. Definition of Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Part I, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1987) (statement of Charles C. Cox, Commissioner,
SEC).
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1987, the Commission submitted a proposed legislative definition of insider trading
to the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee. 74 The Subcommittee already had been holding hearings on a bill,
prepared by a committee of securities lawyers, that differed in some respects from the
SEC proposal. 75 Then, in November, shortly after the Supreme Court issued the
Carpenter opinion,76 the SEC sent to the Subcommittee a revised proposal entitled
"The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987" (the "ITPA" or "the Act"). 77
Most of the provisions of this "proposal for compromise legislation," according to
the chairman of the SEC, were acceptable to both the lawyers' committee and a
majority of the members of the Commission. 78
If enacted into law, the compromise version of the ITPA would add section 16A
to the Securities Exchange Act of 193479 and make conforming amendments to other
sections of the Exchange Act. 80 Proposed section 16A would bar a person from
trading in securities while in possession of material nonpublic information relating to
those securities if he "kn[ew] or recklessly disregard[ed]" 81 that the information had
been "obtained wrongfully," or that his trading would constitute a "wrongful use"
of the information. 82 Trading while in possession of material nonpublic information
would be "wrongful" if the information had been obtained by, or its use would
constitute, "(A) theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through electronic or
other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any other breach of a fiduciary
duty, breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach
of any contractual or employment relationship."-8 3 A person who would violate
section 16A by trading while in possession of material nonpublic information would
also violate the section by "wrongfully" communicating that information to a tippee
who traded while in possession of it, or to a tippee who communicated it to a
subtippee who traded while in possession of it, if the trading by the tippee or
subtippee was "reasonably foreseeable.' '84 Further, section 16A would give any
74. See Definition of Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Part H, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987) (memorandum of SEC in support of
proposed bill entitled "The InsiderTrading Act of 1987"), 52-56 (text of proposed bill entitled "The InsiderTrading Act
of 1987").
75. See id. at 1 (opening statement of Senator Riegle), 48-51 (text of S. 1380, drafted by lawyers' committee).
76. Carpenter was decided on November 16, 1987. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
77. See Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder to Senator Donald W. Riegle, Chairman, Securities Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Senator Alfonse D'Amato, Securities Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,202 (Nov. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Letter
from SEC Chairman Ruder]. Both the SEC Chairman's transmittal letter (dated Nov. 16, 1987) and the proposed bill
entitled "The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987" (dated Nov. 18, 1987) appear at 84,202.
78. Id. at 88,913-14.
79. The Exchange Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
80. The ITPA would amend §§ 20(d), 21(d)(2)(A), and 21(d)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(d),
78u(d)(2)(A), 78u(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986). The proposed amendments to these provisions are not discussed in this
Article.
81. See Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,916 (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(b)(l)). It is
hard to imagine how a person could recklessly disregard a fact that he did not know. Perhaps the drafters intended to
outlaw trading by a person who recklessly disregarded evidence indicating that the information in his possession had been
obtained wrongfully, or was reckless in not knowing that his trading would constitute a wrongful use of the information.
82. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(b)(1)).
83. Id.
84. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(c)).
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person who traded contemporaneously on the opposite side of the market a cause of
action against a defendant who traded in violation of the section, 85 and would give
any other person injured by a violation of the section "in connection with such
person's purchase or sale of securities" a right to sue for damages or equitable
relief. 86 A person who tipped information in violation of section 16A would be jointly
and severally liable with his tippees or subtippees. 87
The foregoing summary of the provisions of the ITPA, while selective, 88 is
sufficient to demonstrate that the Act is not simply a restatement of the current law
of insider trading. In fact, the Act would go considerably farther than the courts have
gone, even with the aid of the misappropriation theory, in imposing liability on those
who trade on material nonpublic information. 89 First, the Act would outlaw some
varieties of misconduct that cannot be reached by rule lOb-5, which only prohibits
"fraud. "90 Second, the Act would grant private remedies to some persons who do not
have, and to other persons who may not have, such remedies under existing law.91
B. The Definition of "Wrongful" Trading
Over the years, many commentators have argued that Congress should enact a
statute under which a defendant's liability for trading on nonpublic information would
not depend, as it does under rule 10b-5, on whether he committed "fraud. ' 92 Under
rule lOb-5, the central inquiry in insider-trading cases is whether the defendant traded
on the basis of material nonpublic information which he obtained through "fraud,"
or whether his trading or tipping constituted "fraud." 9 3 Under the ITPA, on the other
hand, the central inquiry would be whether the defendant traded while in possession
of material nonpublic information which he had obtained "wrongfully," or whether
85. See id. at 88,917 (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(1)(A)). The defendant's liability to contemporaneous
traders would be limited to the amount of his "actual profit obtained or loss avoided," and the damages awarded against
him would be diminished by any amount that he had been ordered to disgorge in an action brought by the SEC. See id.
(proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(2)).
86. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(1)(B)).
87. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(3)).
88. Provisions of the Act other than those discussed in the text would set forth legislative findings, codify the
present SEC rule outlawing trading and tipping by persons in possession of material nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer, limit the respondeat superior liability of employers or controlling persons for violations of the Act by
employees or controlled persons, grant the Commission broad power to create exemptions from the provisions of the Act,
and establish a statute of limitations for the commencement of private actions under the Act. See id. at 88,916-18.
89. The ITPA would make a number of changes in the law in addition to those discussed in this Article. For
example, the Act would establish that an individual can be held liable for trading "while in possession of" material
nonpublic information without a showing that the person traded "on the basis of" that information. See generally
Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37 VANt. L. Ra. 1273, 1289-90
(1984) (suggesting that Congress already has endorsed the view that a person can violate rule lOb-5 by trading "while
in possession of" material nonpublic information). This Article focuses on two questions-what constitutes unlawful
trading, and who can recover damages from defendants who have engaged in such trading-to which the ITPA would
provide answers different from those provided by the misappropriation theory.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 92-100.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 111-33.
92. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Federal Regulation of Securities, supra note 30, at 253; Freeman, The Insider
Trading Sanctions Bill-A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PAcE L. REv. 221 (1984); Phillips & Zutz, supra note 30; Seligman,
The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1137-40 (1985).
93. "Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud." Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
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his trading or tipping was "wrongful." '94 The proposed Act itself lists the means of
acquiring or using information which, if the Act were adopted, would be considered
"wrongful. 
"95
Because the ITPA would shift the focus from "fraud" to "wrongfulness," there
is a possibility that merely negligent conduct would violate the Act. The "scienter"
requirement that is an essential element of "fraud" ensures that a defendant cannot
commit a non-reckless, inadvertent violation of rule lOb-5. 96 A corporate insider
would violate the ITPA, however, by "wrongfully" communicating material
nonpublic information relating to the corporation's securities to another person who,
while in possession of the information, engaged in reasonably foreseeable trading in
the securities. 97 The insider's communication of the information would be
"wrongful" if he "kn[ew] or recklessly disregard[ed]" that its communication
"would constitute, directly or indirectly .... any... breach of a fiduciary duty,
breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any
contractual or employment relationship. ' 98 The ITPA would not explicitly require
that the critical breach of a duty or a relationship be intentional, or reckless, or
self-serving. Thus, should some material nonpublic information slip from the lips of
a company official who had had a few drinks, or should an aggressive securities
analyst pry out of an official more information than he ought to have disclosed, it
appears that the official would be in violation of the Act if the recipients of the
information traded in the securities to which it related, and their trading was
reasonably foreseeable. 99 Whether this result was intended is unclear. What is clear
is that the drafters' reliance on unqualified and elastic phrases like "breach of any...
relationship of trust and confidence" would do little to "reduc[e] uncertainties in the
state of the law."'10
Free of dependence on the concept of "fraud," the ITPA would fill some gaps
that exist under rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court's pre-Carpenter decisions on insider
trading'0 1 establish that a person violates rule lOb-5 by buying or selling securities on
the basis of material nonpublic information if he owes a fiduciary or similar duty to
the party with whom he trades; or if he is an insider of the issuer in whose shares he
trades, and thus owes a fiduciary duty to the issuer's shareholders; or if he is a tippee
who received information from an insider of the issuer and knows, or should know,
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
96. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) (concluding that "scienter is a necessary element of a violation
of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5").
97. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
100. Proposed § 16A(a)(5) of the Exchange Act would read as follows:
It is appropriate to, and this section does, establish exclusive statutory prohibitions that clarify the conduct that
constitutes the wrongful trading of securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information, and the
wrongful communication of such information under the federal securities laws, thereby reducing uncertainties
in the state of the law without otherwise affecting existing statutory prohibitions against manipulative, deceptive
or fraudulent conduct.
Letterfirom SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,916 (emphasis added).
101. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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that the insider breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing the information to him. l0 2 The
Second Circuit decisions embracing the misappropriation theory establish, in
addition, that a person violates rule lOb-5 by buying or selling securities on the basis
of material nonpublic information if he or a coconspirator misappropriated that
information from another person. 103 Neither the Supreme Court decisions nor the
Second Circuit decisions, however, outlaw an outsider's trading on material
nonpublic information which he stole from a stranger, t ° 4 accidentally overheard,10 5
or used with the owner's permission. 10 6 The ITPA, as drafted by the SEC, would
prohibit the ordinary thief from trading on information he stole, 10 7 and might prohibit
one who serendipitously acquired information from trading on it. 108 Oddly, the ITPA
apparently would not, under any circumstances, prohibit an outsider from trading on
the basis of nonpublic information which the rightful owner of the information
authorized him to use in his trading. 0 9 The notion that the Wall Street Journal should
be permitted to immunize its reporters from liability for trading on advance
information concerning articles to be published in the Journal is troubling, to say the
least.110 Although there are some anomalies in the law of insider trading as the courts
have developed it under rule lOb-5, these anomalies should not be perpetuated in a
statute specifically designed to define what is and what is not "wrongful" trading on
nonpublic information.
102. Aldave, supra note 7, at 101-02.
103. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); SEC v. Materia,
745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
104. See Aldave, supra note 7, at 122.
105. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that rule lOb-5 does not prohibit an outsider
from trading on the basis of information inadvertently revealed by an insider).
106. See Aldave, supra note 7, at 121-22.
107. "Tirading while in possession of material, nonpublic information is wrongful... if such information has been
obtained by... theft .... " Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,916 (proposed Exchange Act §
16A(b)(l)).
108. An insider who negligently or recklessly disclosed material nonpublic information to an outsider--e.g., by
speaking so loudly that he was overheard-might be guilty of "wrongfully" communicating the information. "[I]nfor-
mation is wrongfully communicated... if the person making the communication knows or recklessly disregards that...
its communication would constitute, directly or indirectly.... any.. . breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any personal
or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any contractual or employment relationship." See id. (proposed
Exchange Act § 16A(c)). If the outsider then traded while in possession of the information, and his trade was "reasonably
foreseeable," the insider would be in violation of proposed § 16A(c). See supra text accompanying note 84. The outsider
would be in violation of proposed § 16A(b)(1) if he "kn[ew] or recklessly disregard[ed]" that his trading constituted a
"wrongful use" of the information. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
On the other hand, an outsider who observed a huge explosion in the XYZ factory while driving past it on a deserted
road would not be in violation of the ITPA if he immediately called his broker and sold all his XYZ stock. Although he
possessed material nonpublie information, he did not obtain it "wrongfully," and his trading on the basis of that
information would not constitute a "wrongful use" of it. See id.
109. The letter which Chairman Ruder sent to the Senate with the SEC proposal for the ITPA addressed the point:
[A]s under existing case law, "misappropriation" and "conversion" refer to possession or use of information
in breach of a preexisting duty of confidentiality or non-use arising from the expectations of the parties thereto,
or from law. The proposed section 16A(b) per se does not create such duties, nor would section 29 of the
Securities Exchange Act invalidate otherwise lawful agreements to waive any such preexisting duties.
Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,914-15.
110. The misappropriation theory has been criticized for its inability to reach an employee who traded on nonpublic
information with the permission of his employer. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Wang, supra note 30, at 1296.
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C. Private Causes of Action
Besides defining the circumstances under which it would be unlawful for a
person to trade on material nonpublic information or to communicate such informa-
tion to other traders, the ITPA would create two private causes of action. First, any
person who "contemporaneously" purchased securities of the class which the
defendant sold, or sold securities of the class which the defendant purchased, could
sue a defendant who violated the Act by trading in securities while in possession of
material nonpublic information that was obtained or used wrongfully."' The
defendant's liability would be limited to the amount of her "actual profit obtained or
loss avoided," 112 and the damages awarded against her would be diminished by any
amount that she had been ordered to disgorge in an action brought by the
Commission. 113 Second, any other purchaser or seller of securities who was injured
by a violation of the Act could sue to recover "any damages caused by reason of such
violation, or for appropriate equitable relief, or both." 114
The remedy which the ITPA would grant to persons who traded contempora-
neously with the defendant appears to be modeled on the remedy which the Second
Circuit developed in two rule lOb-5 cases, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.115 and Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.116 These decisions allow
plaintiffs who purchased securities in the open market during a period when insiders
ortippees were selling securities of the same class on the basis of material nonpublic
information, or sold securities in the open market during a period when insiders or
tippees were purchasing securities of the same class on the basis of material nonpublic
information, to recover damages up to the amount of the defendants' trading
profits.' '1 Shapiro and Elkind, it should be stressed, authorize actions for damages by
plaintiffs who traded on the other side of the market from insiders or tippees-
defendants who owed an obligation to the issuer's shareholders either to disclose
material inside information or to abstain from trading. II Although the Second Circuit
permits open-market traders to sue insiders or tippees who breached a disclose-or-
111. See Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,917 (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(1)(A)).
112. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(2)).
A person who violated § 16A by tipping would be jointly and severally liable with "any persons who obtained profits
or avoided losses" as a consequence of the tipping. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(3)).
113. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(2)).
114. See id. (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(1)(B)).
115. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
117. In Shapiro, theSecond Circuit held that all persons who purchased particular securities during the period when
the defendant tippees were selling securities of the same class could recover damages against the tippees and their tippers.
The court acknowledged that the resulting liability of the defendants might be "Draconian," but left the task of
determining the proper measure of damages to the district court on remand. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974). Subsequently, in Elkind, the Second Circuit held that a non-trading tipper
whose tippees had sold securities on the basis of the tipped information could not be held liable for damages in excess
of the tippees' profits. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Supreme Court affirmed that a corporation's insiders owe a
fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders, so that the insiders are required either to disclose material inside
information or to abstain from trading in the corporation's securities. Id. at 653. Further, the Court held that a tippee
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, and acquires the obligation to abstain from trading on inside information,
"when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach." Id. at 660 (footnote omitted).
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abstain obligation that was owed to them, it does not allow such traders to sue
defendants who breached only a duty that was owed to a third party. 119 Thus, if the
sole basis of a defendant's liability under rule lOb-5 is that she defrauded her
employer or some other person by misappropriating material nonpublic information,
and then purchased or sold securities on the basis of that information, the Second
Circuit will not allow contemporaneous traders to recover damages from her. 120
The ITPA would not distinguish, as do the Second Circuit precedents under rule
lOb-5, between the civil liability of a defendant who breached a duty to the issuer's
shareholders and the civil liability of a defendant who breached a duty to a third party.
The defendant's trading while in possession of material nonpublic information may
have been "wrongful" because she used the information in violation of a fiduciary
duty to the issuer or its shareholders, or may have been "wrongful" because she
misappropriated the information from a third party. 12 1 In either case, the ITPA would
allow a suit against her by persons who traded during the same period, but on the
other side of the market. 122 In fact, however, in neither case would the class of
potential plaintiffs include all the persons, or only the persons, who actually were
harmed by the defendant's trading. The persons who actually were harmed by the
defendant's trading, as opposed to her failure to disclose material nonpublic
information or her misappropriation of such information, were the investors who
were induced by her trading to make unfavorable purchases or sales, or were
preempted by her trading from making favorable purchases or sales. 23 Unfortu-
nately, these investors ordinarily cannot be identified. 124
In proposing that the ITPA grant a private cause of action to persons who traded
on the opposite side of the market from the defendant, the SEC must have reasoned
that private suits would aid in enforcing the prohibitions of the Act. As commentators
have observed, however, allowing individual investors or classes of investors to sue
to recover a defendant's illicit profits is not an efficient means of deterring unlawful
trading. 25 Private suits do not contribute significantly to the enforcement of the
current rules against trading on material nonpublic information, because such suits
typically are filed only after the SEC has discovered the unlawful trading and taken
action against the wrongdoers.126 On the other hand, governmental sanctions-
119. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). For a
discussion of the facts of Moss, see supra note 63. The Second Circuit held that the district court had properly dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint, because he had "failed to demonstrate that he was owed a duty by any defendant." Id. at 15
(emphasis added).
120. Id. at 12-13, 15-16.
121. See Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,916 (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(b)(1)).
122. See id. at 88,917 (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(1)(A)).
123. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 49.
125. See, e.g., Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. Ry. 1, 73 (1980) (concluding that
"[plublic enforcers clearly must bear the entire burden of regulation"); Karijala, Statutory Regulation ofInsider Trading
in Impersonal Markets, 1982 DtKE L.J. 627, 649 (concluding that the issuer of the securities that were unlawfully traded
should be the only party authorized to bring a private action).
126. See Dooley, supra note 125, at 16-17.
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injunctions, 127 disgorgement orders, 128 civil fines, 129 and criminal penalties13 0-are
well-suited to the goals of deterring unlawful trading and punishing those who engage
in it.
In addition to authorizing private actions by purchasers or sellers who traded on
the opposite side of the market from defendants who engaged in wrongful trading, the
ITPA would grant a cause of action to any other purchaser or seller who was injured
by a violation of the Act.' 3' Presumably, the major beneficiaries of this cause of
action would be takeover bidders which paid inflated prices for the shares of target
companies because of unlawful trading by employees of investment banks or other
fimns to which the bidders had entrusted information about their takeover plans.132
Whether Congress should create a federal remedy for such injured bidders or remit
them to their possible contract and tort remedies under state law is a question which
deserves careful consideration. In the last two or three years a number of acquiring
companies have filed suits asserting both state and federal claims for damages
attributable to unlawful trading or tipping by employees of financial
intermediaries. 133 At this juncture, before it has been determined whether or not state
law is adequate to the task of providing compensation to injured bidders, the proposal
of a new federal cause of action for them is premature.
V. CONCLUSION
In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court missed two important
opportunities-the opportunity to endorse the misappropriation theory as a basis for
liability under rule lOb-5, and the opportunity to refute the argument that insider
trading does not harm investors. The Carpenter decision will not, however, have any
disastrous consequences. Since the Court neither approved nor disapproved the
misappropriation theory, the SEC and the Justice Department can continue to rely on
that theory, and the lower courts can continue to base judgments on it.
By giving an expansive reading to the federal statutes outlawing mail and wire
fraud, the Carpenter decision will make it easier for the government to obtain
criminal convictions in insider-trading cases. The Court's ruling also increases the
possibility that some private plaintiffs will succeed in recovering damages from
127. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982).
128. See Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J. 641.
129. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
130. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
131. See Letter from SEC Chairman Ruder, supra note 77, at 88,917 (proposed Exchange Act § 16A(g)(1)(B)).
132. "Trading in a target company's stock by intermediaries, such as investment bankers and lawyers, prior to the
public announcement of a tender offer or merger can drive up the price of the target shares, thereby making the acquisition
more difficult and less profitable for a potential acquirer." Note, Insider Trading by Intermediaries: A Contract Remedy
for Acquirers' Increased Costs of Takeovers, 97 YALE L.J. 115, 115-16 (1987) (footnotes onitted).
The role of unlawful trading in increasing the prices of target company stocks is difficult to assess. Speculation by
arbitrageurs and open-market purchases on behalf of acquiring companies may be "more plausible explanations of
massive price movements in target company stocks than insider trading by professionals and their tippees." Garten,
Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wis. L. Ray. 573, 630 (footnote omitted).
133. See, e.g., Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86-6447 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 19, 1986);
Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Thayer, No. CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex. filed Apr. 26, 1985). See also FMC Corp. v. Boesky,
673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. IlI. 1987) (dismissing corporation's complaint alleging that insider trading raised cost of
recapitalization).
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defendants who traded on misappropriated information. A plaintiff who can establish
that the defendants committed mail fraud or wire fraud, and injured him in his
"business or property," may be able to state a claim for treble damages against the
defendants in a RICO action.
Since Carpenter does not undermine the existing system of civil and criminal
sanctions for insider trading, it does not create a need for corrective legislation. The
"compromise" bill that the SEC has submitted to Congress would significantly
expand the definition of unlawful trading, would overturn old doctrines and create
new uncertainties, and would grant remedies of questionable merit to private parties.
Given the absence of any pressing need for legislation and the deficiencies of the
compromise proposal, Congress should stay its hand and allow the courts to continue
developing the law of insider trading. As we say in Texas, "If it ain't broke, don't
fix it."

